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The balance of power 
is being disturbed
In H2’06, the cohabitation of a “strong”
President and a “strong” Government,
both of whom had significant
Constitutional powers but came from
different political camps, allowed a
certain balance between the two
government institutions. As in other
countries, this kind of cohabitation
blocked the implementation of
systematic policy at the state level.
However, finding it impossible to
implement policy on a unilateral basis,
the various players had to seek
compromise and make concessions to
each other at least regarding such issues
as Ukraine’s accession to the WTO and the
adoption of the State Budget. This
balance contributed to a relatively
democratic political situation. 
But the Verkhovna Rada coalition and one
of the opposition factions proved ready
to override a Presidential veto on a
Cabinet Law that redistributed powers
from the President to the Cabinet of
Ministers. Moreover, this was done in a
manner whose compliance with the
Ukrainian Constitution is in serious
doubt, demonstrating how instable the
political balance in Ukraine really is. 
The Verkhovna Rada majority shows every
intention of continuing along this
course—adopting laws that expand its
powers and those of the Government and
curtail the powers of the President,
regardless of any problems with the
consistency of these laws and their
compliance with existing legal norms.
Similar initiatives include a Bill on the
President and amendments to the Law on
the National Security Council. 
Recent decisions 
harm democracy 
The Government and the Rada majority
insist that the purpose of this process is
to move towards a parliamentary
republic. But the means used to achieve
this goal raise serious doubts whether
the result will be democratic.
Firstly, the rules that govern relations
between the President and the Cabinet
have become more contradictory, not less.
Having a choice between ordinary laws
and the Constitution, political players will
begin even more to base their decisions
on regulations whose legitimacy they
uphold or regulations that benefit them.
The Cabinet of Ministers will follow the
Law just passed, while the President will
be driven by his understanding of the
Constitution, which is the highest direct
Law of the land. In practice, decisions will
be implemented in those instances where
the decisionmaker has direct power over
those who must carry out the decision.
This situation will weaken the legitimacy
of nearly all government decisions derived
from newly adopted laws.
Secondly, there is no guarantee that the
practice of ignoring the Constitution will
not now be repeated. If the country does
not adhere to the principle of rule of law,
nobody can be sure that their powers are
protected. There is no way to be certain,
now, that the Rada opposition,
independent media or the other
institutions needed for democracy to
function will not become the next victims
whose wings are clipped after the
President.
The judiciary cannot guarantee 
rule of law
The adoption of laws that are legally
suspect can be corrected when an
independent judiciary does its job
properly. Balance of power can, for
instance, be restored through the
Constitutional Court, according to
procedures specified in law.
The adoption and publication of the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers has
confronted Ukrainian society with a critical problem, say ICPS analysts Viktor
Chumak, Ivan Presniakov and Oleh Myroshnichenko. The Verkhovna Rada is
deliberately passing laws that contradict the Constitution. In the heat of
political competition, politicians have been ignoring the principle of rule of law
in an evermore blatant manner. This means the preservation of democracy in
Ukraine will now be guaranteed, not by laws, but by the goodwill of political
leaders. As the coalition and the Government show little respect for the law,
there is no guarantee that they will not curtail other political institutions
whose responsibility is to oversee the Government and to criticize it—the
opposition, the media and civil society
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By the way...
• ICPS is launching a series of analytical
seminars for employees and partners
of the Centre. These seminars will run
twice a month. The second seminar
took place on 9 February, called
“Analysis of the Current Situation.
What Does it Mean for Ukraine?” 
On 26 January, ICPS Director
Volodymyr Nikitin held the first 
seminar, devoted to covering the key
training objectives and the first 
seminar topic, “Megatrends.”
Participants in this first seminar
included the Centre’s experts and
Honorary Chair of the ICPS Supervisory
Board Vira Nanivska. 
• As part of the “Building Support for a
Comprehensive Approach to Security
Sector Reform in Ukraine” project, a
workshop called “Comprehensive
Survey of the Security Sector Reform”
took place on 30 January. The Centre’s
specialists and specialists from
Government agencies and other think
tanks analyzed the state of reforms in
the security sector. They identified key
current and potential problems and
the positions of stakeholders, and 
discussed the advantages of effective
reforms, that is, as an integrated and
systematic process.
But there are serious doubts whether
Ukraine’s Constitutional Court will be
able to quickly decide whether new
legislative norms comply with the
Constitution. At the moment, as much as
4–5 months can pass from the time a law
comes into force to the time when the
Court cancels any illegitimate act. To give
an idea of how long it takes to wait for a
Constitutional Court ruling, the Court
began hearing one appeal that was
submitted on 20 September 2006 only on
18 January 2007—four months later. If
the coalition makes new decisions that
are questionable as to their
Constitutionality during this time, the
Constitutional Court will not be able to
quickly evaluate these new decisions.
This will leave relations among
government institutions in legal limbo, if
not outright chaos in the meantime.
At the level of courts of general
jurisdiction, this situation can raise
conflicts as a result of a wave of claims
filed by ordinary citizens and civil
servants based on legal acts at various
levels—the Constitution and amended
laws on the Cabinet of Ministers, local
administrations, and so on.
Soon, Ukraine is likely to witness
“raiding” of a new type. Having armed
themselves with mutually contradictory
court decisions on the legality of a
particular appointment by the President
or the Government, candidates for
positions of deputy ministers or deputy
governors of local administrations will
assault executive buildings and take
higher offices by force. The example of
the Mukacheve court banning the
publication of the Law on the Cabinet of
Ministers is only the first sign. 
What can be done?
The main condition for democracy in
Ukraine to be stable is to immediately
enforce the principle of rule of law. The
main instruments of this must be a
strong, impartial judicial system and an
effective, independent Constitutional
Court.
As with all strategic goals, this goal
cannot be achieved easily or rapidly. It
will require a lot of time, which means
that the President, the opposition and
the Government should begin to work on
it right now.
The vigor with which the President and
his Secretariat are fighting over the Law
on the Cabinet would yield more results if
they focused on lobbying for reform of
the judiciary and of law enforcement
bodies, especially as Concepts for these
two sets of reform were developed 
long ago. In addition, with an 
instrument like the National Security
Council, this issue can be raised at an
NSC meeting and the necessary Decrees
issued that are binding on the
Government.
The Verkhovna Rada opposition could
bring equally worthwhile benefits to
Ukrainian society, if, at when debating
the 2007 State Budget, it would ask 
aloud how much money the Budget 
has allocated to implement these 
reforms instead of vaguely reproaching
the Cabinet for its “antisocial” Budget.
One effective measure would be a
campaign among ordinary Ukrainians 
and thinktanks oriented on
jurisprudence for a legal evaluation 
of the legality of government decision
making, involving wide media coverage 
of the issue of the failure of 
government bodies to adhere to 
the rule of law.
For additional information, contact ICPS
analyst Ivan Presniakov by telephone at
(38044) 4844400 or via email at
ipresniakov@icps.kiev.ua 
Shortterm economic expectations among
Ukrainians continue to be extremely
pessimistic: this index x3 was 81.9 in
December 2006. Longterm economic
expectations also deteriorated over
October–December. The index x4 fell 
6 points over this period, to 90.2. 
The reason for this is evidently
disappointment among Ukrainian
consumers over the country’s economic
policy.
Despite pessimistic economic
expectations, the number of Ukrainians
who expect that their financial standing
to improve over the next six months
actually grew over October–December.
The index x2 climbed 4.9 points over this
period, to 89.2. The readiness of
consumers to purchase large household
items continues to be strong: the Index
of Propensity to Consume (x5) was 107.3
in December 2006. A value above the
100mark shows that the majority of
Ukrainians think that now is generally a
good time to purchase durable goods.
The highest propensity to consume was
registered in Kyiv. Its index x5 rose to
125.0 in December 2006, 11.7 points
above the value registered in October.
At the same time, economic expectations
were worse among Kyiv residents than in
any other region. In December 2006, the
Index of Economic Expectations (IEE) in
Kyiv was 60.0, a striking 21.7 points
below the national average. Extremely
negative economic expectations among
Kyiv residents are possibly related to
steep rises in utility rates in the capital,
against the background of public
controversy over the legitimacy of these
rate increases, and also lack of
confidence in the Mayor and the
municipal administration. As a result,
inflationary expectations in Kyiv were
also the worst: the Index of Inflationary
Expectations (IIE) was 196.7 in
December 2006, 10.3 points above the
national average.
Consumer confidence in other major
cities improved noticeably. In December
2006, their CCI was 112.6, 17.7 points
above the value registered in October.
The propensity to consume in large urban
areas also grew sharply: this index x5 was
132.3, a healthy 21.5 points above the
value registered in October.
Consumer confidence deteriorated 
among lowincome Ukrainians and older
consumers, those aged 46–59. From
October to December 2006, the CCI for
Ukrainians with belowaverage incomes
fell 7.5 points to 66.9, while the CCI for
older Ukrainians dropped 6.4 points to
74.8. This deterioration was mainly
because of growing negative economic
expectations.
For additional information about this
survey, contact Yevhenia Akhtyrko by
telephone at (38044) 4844403 or via 
email at eakhtyrko@icps.kiev.ua.
In December 2006, the traditional improvement in the consumer mood in the
runup to the holiday season failed to materialize. The Consumer Confidence
Index (CCI) even slipped slightly in December, to 90.6, which is 0.6 points
below the CCI value registered during the previous poll in October 2006
Consumer Confidence: Holiday season
fails to lift consumer mood
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